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Cross-Appellants Susie Strohm ("Strohm") and Dorsey & Whitney LLP 
("Dorsey") respectfully submit this Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Cross-
Appellee ClearOne Communications, Inc. ("ClearOne"). 
INTRODUCTION 
Dorsey and Strohm's narrow cross-appeal challenges three distinct legal errors the 
district court committed in limiting its award of attorneys' fees under the Engagement 
Agreements. ClearOne's opposition fails to address the central deficiency of the district 
court's analysis on which the cross-appeal is based: the district court, having correctly 
concluded that ClearOne had a contractual duty to pay Strohm's attorneys' fees and 
interest thereon, was then bound to enforce the parties' contract as written. It could not 
properly impose arbitrary limits on ClearOne's contractual obligations without 
articulating the legal basis therefor. 
ClearOne's opposition provides little support for the district court's errors. It does 
not cite a single legal authority (save for the 10th Circuit's affirmance of Strohm's 
conviction), and argues, essentially, that the district court had unbridled discretion to 
grant or withhold relief under the parties' contract as it saw fit. ClearOne is wrong. The 
rulings challenged by Dorsey and Strohm's cross-appeal are erroneous and should be 
reversed. 
1 
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ARGUMENT 
I. CLEARONE'S CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO PAY DORSEY AND 
STROHM'S FEES IS A MATTER OF LAW REVIEWED FOR 
CORRECTNESS. 
Although ClearOne does not examine the correct standard of review for the issues 
on cross-appeal, it implies that the district court's holdings should be reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. (App. Reply Br. at 2)} Any such implication is incorrect.2 
It is well established that a trial court has discretion to determine the proper 
amount of an award of attorneys' fees according to a standard of reasonableness. See 
Valcarce v. Fizgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). That discretion only extends, 
however, to "calculation" of the fee award. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 
988 (Utah 1988). The preliminary question of whether a party is entitled to attorneys' 
fees for prevailing on a particular claim, or in a particular phase of an action, "is a 
question of law," Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315, and "attorneys fees, when awarded as 
allowed by law, are awarded as a matter of legal right," Cabrera v. Cottrel, 694 P.2d 622, 
625 (Utah 1985). When a party is entitled to attorneys' fees under a contract, fees must 
1 In this Brief, ClearOne's Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee will 
be cited as (App. Reply Br. at ). Strohm and Dorsey's Brief of Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, where these cross-appeal issues are first discussed, will be cited as 
(Cross-App. Br. at ). 
2 ClearOne quotes a statement in Dorsey and Strohm's original brief that the district 
court abused its discretion in arbitrarily limiting its fee award (App. Reply Br. at 43), 
but Dorsey and Strohm only used such language to show that the district court erred 
under any standard of appellate review. Dorsey and Strohm expressly stated in their 
original brief that these issues require only the interpretation of contract terms and are 
therefore matters of law requiring no deference to the trial judge's legal 
determinations. (Cross-App. Br. at 57). 
2 
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be awarded "only in accordance with the terms of the contract." Soft solutions, Inc. v. 
Brigham Young University, 2000 UT 46, ^ 41, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000). 
The district court in this case correctly concluded that ClearOne was obligated to 
pay Dorsey and Strohm's fees under the Engagement Agreements, but it then limited the 
fee award in three arbitrary and improper ways. First, for the underlying defense of the 
Criminal Case, the district court ruled that "from the date of [the] jury verdict [forward] 
ClearOne shall not be held liable, at this time, to pay Strohm's fees and expenses in the 
criminal case post-February 2009, all of which may be attributed to the perjury count." 
(R.5154). Second, the court "expressly impose[d] August 10, 2010" as the last date for 
which Plaintiffs could seek to recover fees and costs in the Collection Case. (R.5176). 
Third, the district court held that the 18% prejudgment interest provided for under the 
Engagement Agreements would accrue on fees awarded in the Criminal Case, but not on 
fees awarded in the Collection Case. (R.5178). 
In so ruling, the district court implicitly determined that the limits it established 
were consistent with the terms of the Agreements. Its decision thus inherently turned on 
an interpretation of the parties' contract. 
Utah law is unequivocal: interpretation of a contract that requires no extrinsic or 
factual findings is a matter of law, and is reviewed for correctness on appeal. See 
Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Utah Dep't ofTransp., 2011 UT 35, ^  13, 266 P.3d 
671 (Utah 2011). The appellate court gives "no deference to the ruling of the district 
3 
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court." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Meadowbrook, LLC 
v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1998). 
In this case the district court did rely on extrinsic evidence to interpret the parties' 
contract, but the extrinsic evidence was only necessary to resolve those terms that were 
ambiguous—most fundamentally whether the scope of the Engagement Agreements 
included the Criminal Case and whether the terms of the first engagement letter were 
incorporated into the second. The district court resolved these questions—entirely in 
favor of Strohm and Dorsey—in its March 2, 2010 order. (R.2967-68). With those 
issues decided, the district court was required to follow the express terms of the 
Agreements in determining what fees and costs must be awarded. See, e.g., Dixie State 
Bank, 764 P.2d at 988. In failing to do so, the district court erred as a matter of law, and 
this Court should review its decision accordingly. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DECLINING TO AWARD POST-
VERDICT FEES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE. 
The district court refused to award any fees incurred in the Criminal Case after the 
date of the jury verdict because all later fees "must be attributed to the perjury count" on 
which Strohm was found guilty. (R.5154).. It went on to state, however, that "in the event 
Ms. Strohm is ultimately exonerated on that sole count, her claim will then arise for 
reimbursement for all reasonable and necessary fees and expenses." (R.5154). ClearOne 
argues that the district court "effectively" held that these post-verdict fees should not be 
awarded based on public policy grounds, because according to ClearOne Strohm's 
conviction means she did not meet the standard of conduct under the Revised Business 
4 
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Corporation Act. Neither the district court's decision, nor ClearOne's post-hoc 
rationalization of it, can be sustained. 
As a preliminary matter, the district court's holding was clearly not a 
determination of the reasonableness of Dorsey's requested fees, as the district court 
expressly stated that the reasonableness of the fees would be evaluated, depending on 
whether Strohm was ultimately exonerated. (R.5154). Therefore, this decision by the 
district court turns entirely on the terms of the parties' Agreements, and is owed no 
deference on appeal. Meadowbrook, LLC, 959 P.2d at 116. 
The district court's decision to cut off Strohm's fees after her conviction is 
inconsistent with the terms of the parties' contract. The Engagement Agreements are 
clear. In the 2003 engagement letter, ClearOne engaged Marsden "to represent Susie 
Strohm's interests in connection with the SEC civil complaint. . . and in connection with 
further related investigations and litigation." (R.42-43). In the 2004 engagement letter, 
ClearOne engaged Dorsey and Marsden "to represent Susie Strohm in connection with 
the SEC civil complaint, referenced above, and in connection with further related 
investigations and litigation." (R. 47-48). ClearOne agreed that it would pay the "full 
amount of [the] bill within thirty days after receipt." (R. 42-43; 47-48). Nothing in these 
terms, nor any other terms of the Agreements, limits ClearOne's obligation to pay fees 
attributable only to charges of which Strohm was acquitted. 
ClearOne's public policy argument misconstrues the two bases on which Strohm 
and Dorsey are entitled to recover fees and costs, as well as the district court's discussion 
5 
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of public policy in its order on the Engagement Agreements. As explained in Dorsey's 
original brief, the district court first determined, correctly, that Strohm was statutorily 
entitled to mandatory indemnification from ClearOne on all claims on which she was 
successful. (Cross-App. Br. at 21-23); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-902, 903, 905, 
907. The district court then determined that the Engagement Agreements provided an 
alternative means by which Strohm's fees were recoverable.^ (R.2967-68). In 
discussing whether public policy barred recovery under the Engagement Agreements, the 
district court postulated that ClearOne's public policy arguments might have had force 
"[h]ad Ms. Strohm been convicted of one or more counts of securities fraud," but that 
Strohm's one perjury conviction "does not carry the same force or public policy 
concern." (R.5153). 
Thus, the district court did not find that public policy barred recovery under the 
Engagement Agreements, nor did it find that public policy relieved ClearOne of liability 
for fees for the single perjury conviction. (See R.5154). Indeed, the district court did not 
articulate any way in which public policy limited the enforceability of the parties' 
Agreements. Nor could it, for several reasons. First, as established in Dorsey's original 
brief, a conviction is not determinative of whether a defendant met the standard of 
3 It bears emphasis that ClearOne's public policy arguments are irrelevant to the seven 
counts of which Susie Strohm was acquitted. The district court correctly held that 
Strohm was entitled to mandatory indemnification for those counts under Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-10a-903. Regardless of how this Court views the Engagement 
Agreements, mandatory statutory indemnification independently supports the district 
court's fee award and renders moot the vast majority of issues ClearOne raised in its 
appeal, which focuses almost exclusively on the Agreements. 
6 
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conduct set forth in Utah's indemnification statutes, (Cross-App. Br. at 44-45), and 
ClearOne has failed to provide any support for the assertion that Strohm violated the 
statutory standard of conduct. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that Utah public policy 
does not necessarily relieve a corporation of an otherwise binding legal obligation to pay 
an officer or director's attorneys' fees simply because she has not met the statutory 
standard of conduct—Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-905(2) explicitly permits courts to order 
indemnification regardless of whether the defendant met the statutory standard. (See 
Cross-App. Br. at 45). ClearOne's argument that it is "prohibited" from paying these 
post-verdict fees cannot be supported, and to the extent the district court implicitly relied 
on public policy in limiting the award of fees under the Engagement Agreement, it 
erred.4 
In addition, if the district court did indeed limit recovery under the Engagement 
Agreements on the basis of Strohm's conviction, it read into the contract an illegal term. 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(d)(2) provides that an attorney shall not enter into 
an arrangement for "a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case." If, 
as ClearOne suggests, the district court concluded that Strohm and Dorsey's right to 
4 Indeed, the district court's statement that Strohm would be entitled to fees related to 
the count of conviction if she were ultimately exonerated (R.5154) suggests that it 
was considering only statutory indemnification when it cut off the fee award for the 
post-conviction period. Rather than imposing a public policy limitation on Dorsey 
and Strohm's contractual rights, it appears that in considering this portion of the fee 
award the district court simply ignored the Engagement Agreements, which form an 
independent and alternative basis for recovery to which Strohm's conviction is 
irrelevant. 
7 
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collect fees under the Engagement Agreements was contingent on Strohm's acquittal, 
then the district court erred by interpreting the contract in a way that rendered it unlawful. 
Ultimately, however, ClearOne's public policy arguments are beside the point, for 
the district court did not cite public policy as the reason for limiting Dorsey's fees. 
Instead, it simply stated that ClearOne was not liable for post-verdict fees, as they were 
clearly attributable to the perjury count upon which Strohm was convicted. As stated, 
this is not a requirement of the Engagement Agreements, and courts should not and do 
not insert their own terms into a contract. Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 
P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982) ("It is a long-standing rule in Utah that persons dealing at 
armfs length are entitled to contract on their own terms without the intervention of the 
courts to relieve either party from the effects of a bad bargain. This Court will not 
rewrite a contract to supply terms which the parties omitted.") (internal citations omitted). 
Dorsey should be reimbursed under the Engagement Agreements for its full 
representation of Strohm in the Criminal Case, which extended until November 8, 2011, 
when the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN LIMITING THE AWARD OF FEES 
INCURRED IN THE COLLECTION ACTION. 
ClearOne asserts that the district court did not "abuse its discretion" in cutting off 
fees for the Collection Case on August 10, 2010, arguing that the district court was 
making a determination on the reasonableness of Dorsey's fees. (App. Reply Br. at 43-
44). The district court did not characterize this decision as an exercise of its discretion to 
calculate a reasonable fee award, however. Even if it had done so, the decision to simply 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cut off fees on an arbitrary date bears none of the hallmarks of a proper determination of 
reasonableness, and should accordingly be reversed. 
This Court has established clear guidelines on the factors properly used to 
calculate a reasonable fee award. Balwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1199-1200 (Utah 
1993). Those factors include: the extent of services rendered, the difficulty of issues 
involved, the reasonableness of time spent on the case, fees charged in the locality for 
similar services, and the necessity of bringing an action to vindicate rights. Id. at 1200. 
The district court did engage in a detailed analysis of such factors in awarding fees in this 
case, and ultimately reduced the fees Dorsey requested by five percent. (R.5175). 
The district court made clear that the August 10, 2010 cap was unrelated to the 
established reasonableness factors, however. Instead, the court simply imposed this cap 
in an apparent attempt to move the parties toward final adjudication. (R.5176). Even if 
this date limitation were to be considered part of the district court's reasonableness 
determination, the determination was improperly conducted and should be remanded for 
correct calculations. Attorneys' fees should not be limited by use of arbitrary cutoff 
dates, for such a system would have disastrous incentive effects. Once a cutoff date is 
established, the party owing fees has every incentive to draw out the dispute for as long 
as possible. This case is the perfect example. If the district court's arbitrary date were to 
stand, the work that Dorsey has been forced to do to defend this appeal, which ClearOne 
brought, would go unreimbursed. Rather than fostering finality, the district court's 
9 
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imposition of an arbitrary cutoff date had the effect of encouraging interminable 
litigation. 
Certainly the Engagement Agreements contain no term that supports the district 
court's decision to cut off all fees after August 10, 2010. and that decision is thus 
erroneous as a matter of law. Even if that decision were properly characterized as 
discretionary, however, it was not a proper exercise of discretion because it was not 
grounded in the clear precedent governing calculation of reasonable attorneys' fees. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO APPLY THE 
CONTRACTUAL 18% INTEREST PROVISION TO THE COLLECTION 
CASE FROM THE START OF THAT ACTION. 
ClearOne again argues that the district court acted within its discretion by 
declining to award Dorsey and Strohm the contractually established 18% prejudgment 
interest on fees incurred in the Collection Case. Again, however, the district court's 
decision constitutes legal error, and should be reviewed for correctness, as the district 
court was interpreting the 2003 Engagement Agreement's term regarding prejudgment 
interest. (See R.5177, R.42). Indeed, the district court expressly acknowledged that "the 
determination of entitlement to prejudgment interest is a question of law, reviewed by the 
appellate court for correctness." (R.5178). 
ClearOne argues that the 2003 Engagement Agreement only allowed an 18% 
interest rate on amounts billed in connection with the SEC civil complaint "and in 
connection with further related investigations and litigation," and contends that the 
district court correctly concluded that "fees in connection with [Dorsey's] own 
10 
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engagement letter claim do not constitute amounts billed in connection with the SEC civil 
complaint or further related investigations and litigation.'' (App. Reply Br. at 44). 
ClearOne's argument cannot be squared with the language of the 2003 Agreement, 
however. 
First, the Collection Case is "related" to Dorsey's representation of Strohm in the 
Criminal Case, which the district court correctly concluded falls within the scope of the 
Engagement Agreements. Indeed, the Collection Case is a direct result of the Criminal 
Case. Second, the parties agreed in the 2003 Engagement Agreement to 18% interest on 
fees owed under the Agreement. The 2003 Agreement expressly establishes Dorsey's 
right to collect attorneys' fees incurred in "collecting amounts due" under the Agreement. 
Consequently, fees incurred in the Collection Case are expressly recoverable under the 
2003 Agreement—they are no different from fees incurred in the Criminal Case itself, 
and they are accordingly subject to the only interest provision in the agreement. 
When a contract provides for interest without limiting language, that interest 
should be calculated for all money owed on that contract, from the date it becomes due 
until the date it is paid or an offer of judgment is made. See State Drywall v. Rhodes 
Design & Dev., 127 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Nev. 2006). If that is not the rule, non-prevailing 
parties are incentivized to draw out litigation and delay payment, as the value of that 
payment continues to decrease with the further passage of time. See id. 
11 
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The district court's decision is inconsistent with the language of the parties' 
Agreements and with good policy. It should be reversed and remanded with instructions 
to apply 18% interest to all fees in both the Criminal and Collection Cases. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth in its original brief and this Reply Brief, Dorsey 
respectfully requests that the judgment of the district court be affirmed in all respects, 
except for its rulings limiting (1) reimbursement in the Criminal Case until only 
February 27, 2009; (2) reimbursement in the Collection Case until only August 10, 2010; 
and (3) collection of the contractual 18% interest on only the Criminal Case fee award. 
For only those limited issues, Dorsey and Strohm respectfully request that the Court 
reverse the district court's findings and remand the case to the district court for 
recalculation of a fee award in accordance with the parties' Agreements. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of March, 2012. 
DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP 
Milo Steven Marsden 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees Susie 
Strohm and Dorsey & Whitney LLP 
12 
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